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Abstract: For inter and intra cluster communication, member nodes jointly build a mutual session key called cluster key to allow secure communication. Most existing 
schemes for cluster key management use messages exchange among the member nodes within a cluster for the new cluster key establishment when a node leaves or joins 
a cluster. This causes significant communication and computation costs. Furthermore, the secure distribution of cluster keys among member nodes in frequently changing 
environments is a difficult task without encryption and decryption operations. For secure cluster key management, we utilized polynomial (P) to accomplish effective intra-
cluster key management and produced polynomial for making an inter-cluster key distribution. The main contribution is to generate polynomials and broadcast to nodes 
whenever a change occurs in a network or demanding nodes for secure key management. The presented scheme supports scalability for an increasing number of nodes 
using polynomials. The proposed scheme increases the lifetime of the network by decreasing the key pool size. 
 





Because of random harsh deployment and wireless 
communication, the researcher has concentrated on the 
security of WMSN. In light of the resource constraint 
condition of the WMSNs, usual security systems are not 
viable because they devour energy excessively. 
Subsequently, scientists are presenting novel less 
expensive security techniques for each conceivable 
security part of WMSNs. WMSNs comprise some little, 
low-cost, movable, self-representing closes sensor nodes 
having little capacity to process information [1] and with 
constraint processing, memory, and energy. MICA2 Motes 
sensor node utilizes 8-bit instruction in16 MHz processors 
using 4 KB of EEPROM and 128 KB of reprogrammable 
memory [2]. For better network management and resource 
utilization, WMSN is organized into clusters [3]. Many 
researchers give an argument that cluster mobile sensor 
network can reasonably outperform network effectiveness, 
operational implementation, and increase the network 
lifetime. Conventional security systems using public key 
cryptography causes overhead with respect to 
computational and transmission costs. Key management is 
required for security purposes but is very difficult in such 
a resource constraint network of WMSN [4]. 
In conventional networks, end-to-end security is 
conceivable in light of the fact that it is a bit much for the 
center node to have entry to the substance of data packets. 
Nevertheless, in WMSNs, intermediate node specifically 
gets to the substance of messages; along these lines, it is 
harder to deploy basic end-to-end security. The 
intermediate nodes can without much of a stretch read or, 
then again adjust the information of a source towards the 
target node. The operation of a system can be effortlessly 
disturbed by modifying the packets through the 
intermediate nodes effectively. Besides, any malicious 
intruder node can effectively peruse confidential packets, 
if there is no scheme for securing packets. Intruders can 
inject false data or resend old put away information from 
real node to work the data aggregation handle, coming 
about a man-in-the-middle attack. 
Different nameless security schemes have been 
proposed for WMSN in later past which shows differing 
natures and additional levels of security assurance at 
different prices. In this section, we talk about the current 
cryptography schemes that tended to the issue of key 
management for secure communication in WMSNs. 
Because of the resources limitation in WMSNs, a 
comprehensive harmony between energy usage overhead 
and the security level is expected to moderate the safety 
threats. Some symmetric metrics, for example, Node-ID, 
message authentication code (MCA), nonce-number, and 
time-stamps. These are energy efficient parameters for 
cluster key management techniques. Additionally, this 
keeps away from the distinctive kind of attacks from a 
suspected node and stay away from compromised node 
attacks. Various security schemes presented for WMSNs 
utilize symmetric encryption, because of the simplicity of 
its execution [5]. Other than this, single node 
authentication has turned out to be not able to take care of 
the increasing transmission demand. When the services 
request is growing up day by day, a multiparty calculation 
is fundamental for nodes verification (authentication) 
concurrently and safely. Similarly for inter and intra cluster 
communication, member nodes jointly build a mutual 
session key called cluster key to allow secure exchange of 
messages [6]. 
The whole cluster member authentication at once is 
extremely useful because it can authenticate all nodes of 
cluster simultaneously. This can be utilized for node 
authentication to distinguish between trustable supporters 
and non-supporters as well. For secure communication 
within the same cluster and among various clusters, we 
utilized a polynomial (P) to accomplish effective intra-
cluster key management and produced a polynomial for 
making an inter-cluster key distribution. Thus, our 
presented scheme can be exceedingly successful in every 
authentication and key formation since it might give the 
best broadcast communication. In addition, for 
computation, each node requires a polynomial assessment 
and key-hash highlight. This is less demanding for 
performing encryption and decryption. The main objective 
is to develop a secure and efficient scheme for key 
distribution, calculation, and renewal Prior to the nodes 
deployment in WMSNs, every node is pre-designed with 
an arrangement of symmetric keys shared to the various 
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nodes of the cluster to transfer its Id safely to the CH. When 
the nodes are deployed, each node specified the 
predetermined symmetric keys used for the 
communication with the CH. The CH keeps up all the 
symmetric keys shared to the sensor nodes having a place 
with its cluster. The fundamental goal for utilizing these 
keys is to encourage the multi-hop correspondence while 
communicating secret information mainly, the individual 
proportion dissemination and the exchange fact between 
the CH and BS. The execution of the polynomial that is 
connected for determining an intra-cluster key can 
decrease the cluster (session) key storage overhead at the 
member nodes and their CH. When the intra-cluster key is 
procured, the CH self-creates a polynomial function, which 
is vital for improving an inter-cluster key organization. 
This encourages the decrease in the communication cost of 
the CH. In the cluster key creation for intra-clusters, our 
proposed method reduces the amount of communicated 
messages as a whole in the inter-cluster communication. 
The proposed scheme enhances the WMSN security and 
life-time by lessening the quantity of exchange messages 
during node mobility while diminishing the scope range of 
CH and the requirement for a node to move and join the 
intense scope region of other CH. Our work also presents a 
safe node migration in which dependable handoff happens 
and new connections are built up amongst CHs and 
member nodes. The main contribution of the proposed 
scheme is to generate polynomials whenever a change 
occurs in a network or demanding nodes. Polynomials are 
generated dynamically when change occurs in a cluster to 
create a new cluster key (session key). Therefore, nodes 
must hold only a few pre-assign data. Additionally, the 
presented scheme supports scalability for an increasing 
number of nodes because the polynomials used for 
computation of cluster keys are dynamically generated 
after the deployment. Our scheme frequently refreshes the 
cluster keys (session key) because of the easy new 
polynomial generation. The proposed scheme increases the 
life-time of WMSN by decreasing the key pool size. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides the literature review of some well-known cluster 
key management algorithms for WMSN. Section 3 
describes the network and threat model. Section 3.2 
describes the System model. Section 4 presents a proposed 
polynomial based cluster key management scheme. 
Section 5 describes security analysis of the proposed 
scheme with other scheme and section 6 discusses the 
simulation performance of the proposed scheme. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
After stabling the clustering and CH selection, it is 
necessary to established secure communication between 
the member node and CH of a cluster for data collection. A 
lot of work has been done in static WSN, but in WMSN 
still faces research achievement in establishing secure 
communication in frequently changing topology.  
By and large, security in WSN has been broadly 
researched in recent times [7, 8]. A large portion of the 
security arrangements has been composed either to protect 
WSNs from some known attacks (e.g., particular sending, 
dark gap) or cautious procedures: for example, intrusion 
detection system [9] is proposed.  
Prevention mechanism such as key management 
scheme is presented [10]. The key messages transmitted 
through an intermediate node ought to likewise be secure 
[11]. In any case, they are designed for static WSN [12] 
which requires a vast number of messages to set up and 
maintain update key over the system. In addition, the 
dynamic nature of WMSN (frequent mobility) requires 
keys to be refreshed when needed. This causes immense 
communication overhead on nodes with less energy and 
henceforth decreases their lifetime. 
To build up secure keys among the member node of a 
cluster, the scheme in [13] proposed a Logical Key 
Hierarchy (LKH) where the whole cluster is represented 
like a tree. Leaf nodes i.e. member nodes share symmetric 
keys. The cluster key is allocated to CH. Jen - Chiun Lin et 
al. presented One-way Key derivation (OKD) [14] that 
used the idea of one-way hash function like Dini et. al. 
LKH scheme was additionally enhanced by Je et. al. to 
consider the resources of each node during tree 
development. In these schemes, indirect path keys between 
leaf sensor nodes over the cluster are set up using the CH 
node of a neighbouring cluster. Similarly, another tree-
based cluster key management is presented [15] in which a 
leaf node can calculate keys toward CH. 
One key exchange scheme is Localized Encryption 
and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [16], which was 
proposed to secure the inter-cluster communication of 
WSNs. LEAP organized communication messages and 
presented four sorts of keys inside a network for security. 
Every one of the four keys was shared between individual 
nodes of the WSN. This scheme is very costly because 
large keys are used. 
The paper [17] utilized two polynomial pools, 
common mobile and common static, on which they 
executed three-level architecture to pick up an improved 
level of security for WSNs. The pools have a sensor node 
with getting to focus and movable sinks. Keys are 
conveyed by the access point and the portable sinks. 
Pairwise key pre-distribution techniques are utilized for 
authentication of a node with the assistance of polynomial 
keys. 
One of the key management schemes [18] is presented 
for heterogeneous WMSNs using asymmetric key pre-
distribution and hash function. It utilizes a seed key and 
hash capacity to understand the authentication of a mobile 
CH, however, it just allows CH mobility, and the entire 
members are static. 
A key pre-distribution algorithm where BS provides 
seeds to sensor nodes to compute another key, which gives 
satisfactory security, was depicted in [19]. It permits 
secretly appropriating a secret to an arrangement of 
beneficiaries with just a single multicast correspondence 
[20]. A less expensive XOR-based re-keying scheme is 
presented in [21], which does not need message exchange 
in WSN for key distribution. 
A dynamic polynomial based key management scheme 
is presented in [22] where master node is used for secure 
communication during cluster key establishment. In this 
scheme, some advance nodes are used called H- sensor 
nodes responsible for key management. Every time H-
Sensor nodes generate polynomial when change occurs in 
a cluster. It enhances the left time of the sensor network by 
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reducing the key pool size but this needs advance node 
which increases the cost of a network. 
In [23] the author presents an energy efficient 
distributed deterministic key management algorithm 
(EDDK) for WMSN. EDDK concentrates on the 
establishment and updating of the pairwise keys, also the 
inter cluster keys and can settle a few imperfections in 
some current key management schemes. Construction of 
neighboring table during key establishment not only gives 
the security to key support and information exchange, but 
it can likewise be utilized to adequately deal with the 
storage and refresh of the keys. By utilizing the elliptic 
curve digital signature algorithm in EDDK, both new and 
movable sensor nodes can join or leave or rejoin a sensor 
network safely. The real reason for the low performance of 
EDDK is that it calculates the pairwise keys and changes 
in neighborhood impact on the estimation of pairwise keys, 
which may give the wrong example of pairwise keys and 
needs the recalculation of pairwise keys. 
In [24] a new scheme called cluster based mobile key 
management system (CMKMS) considers two stages, first 
stage for key maintenance which sets up two private keys, 
home key for its own cluster and foreign key when a node 
moves starting with one cluster then onto the next. The 
second stage keeps up the keys when CH moves starting 
with one group then onto the next. The proposed scheme 
enhances the efficiency of key management as far as 
security, energy saving, mobility, and network scalability. 
This scheme has efficiency because of using the RC4 
algorithm for encryption and decryption. 
Naqvi presents a novel key management scheme [25] 
to enhance the energy efficiency, security and scalability 
prerequisites by diminishing the computational complexity 
of the scheme. This scheme keeps running in two stages; in 
the first stage, it sets up the cluster and appoints the home 
and foreign keys to every node. The second stage keeps up 
the key update during the node and CH mobility. Besides, 
to improve energy efficiency, reduce computational 
overhead and to enhance encryption speed, the ECDSA 
encryption algorithm has been used. 
Similarly, many schemes [26-30] have been presented 
for dynamic key generation in cluster WMSN for a 
heterogeneous network, where advance nodes are used for 
key generation and maintenance. 
Most of the existing schemes for cluster key creation 
require messages exchange between member nodes within 
a cluster for the new cluster key establishment when a node 
leaves or joins a cluster. This causes significant 
communication costs. 
 
3 THREAT AND SYSTEM MODELS 
 
In the threat model, initially, the nodes are not 
compromised at the time when networks are deployed. 
After the nodes deployment, attackers can launch attacks.  
Adversaries try to get important data of nodes or 
network by executing some advanced functions. The 
adversary can be in the form of either active or passive 
attacks.  Physical attacks can be launched by an adversary 
to compromising node and get secret data for future use. 
Inside and outside attacks can distribute the vital thing, 
caught data, to interrupt with the security collusively, and 
are called collusive physical attacks. For example, the 
repudiated node and the newly joined nodes can dispatch 
tricky attacks over the cluster key no longer having a place 
with them. Capturing node physical attacks is 
exceptionally destructive to the system if over the top 
cryptographic keys still available inside a node. By and 
large, attacks influencing safe key distribution are 
eavesdropping and node capturing [31]. The presented key 
management scheme is safe from nodes capturing and 
eavesdropping attacks by using effective key distribution 
using the dynamic generation of a polynomial. CH sends 
an expanded polynomial without any encryption and 
decryption for session key to its member nodes. It is very 
difficult to guess the intra-cluster key (session key) key 
management for polynomial because polynomial 
factorization is NP - hard [32]. 
 
3.1 System Model 
 
Our network consists of two types of nodes as shown 
in Fig. 1. One type is a normal node which forms cluster 
using some well known algorithm [33]. The second type of 
node are these which are selected as a cluster head (CH) 
using an algorithm [34]. These nodes have limited 
computation, communication, and storage capacity. Here 
we have assumed that CH cannot be compromised. The 
second type of node is BS having a lot of resources and 
powerful computation. To establish mutual authentication 
among the sensor nodes (sensors, cluster heads), each 
sensor needs to accomplish a shared authentication 
mechanism and create a dynamic shared cluster prior to the 
communication. At last, every node can confirm their 
authenticity using this shared with another. During 
adversary observation, the member nodes of the cluster are 
easily compromised. So a key refreshing mechanism can 
play a crucial capacity to shield from several forthcoming 
deceptive moves of the compromised node. In addition, 
new node addition in network enhances the scalability of 
the system. 
 
4 PROPOSED POLYNOMIAL BASED CLUSTER KEY 
MANAGEMENTSCHEME 
 
This paper presents an efficient key management 
scheme for cluster WMSN. First each sensor node 
including CH, member nodes are preload with unique ID, 
network secret key Nk, hash function (h), encryption and 
decryption function along with unique ID by the BS. 
 
 
Figure 1 Cluster besed Network Model of WMSN 
 
CH has also preload with same and additionally with 
polynomial calculation function. Here we have assumed 
that the CH and BS formed secure authentication 
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mechanism including ECC, which is very difficult to 
inverse. After clustering and CH selection, every member 
node sends its join request message ENk (IDi||MAC(IDi)) 
having ID of CH member nodes and MAC of their ID. We 
assumed that the maximum hop between CH and member 
nodes is one as shown in Fig. 4. After receiving encrypted 
message for every member node, CH decrypts the 
messages, takes ID and computes hash value using hash 
function for every member node to generated polynomial 
using Eq. (2). List of Notation used for the proposed 
scheme is given in Tab. 1. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )1lo 2g( ) e h ID x h kID ,... x h D CIxP x α− − +−=                      (1) 
 
It is expanded as: 
 
( )2log 1 ,..., ( ) e x x x ZxP x
α αα α ε− − −− + − ±
=                               (2) 
 
where α is the size of cluster (member nodes in cluster), 
and x is predefined significant value and hash value of 
every sensor nodes identities (ID) of all cluster member is 
calculated. Ck is the cluster key generated by base station 
and sent to CH. After computing hash values of all member 
nodes ID, CH makes a polynomial using Eq. (1) and then 
expands this polynomial to Eq. (2). The encrypted 
expanded polynomial with NK, ENK (P(x)||MAC(P(x))) is 
distributed to the member nodes of cluster. 
After receiving this, each cluster member node 
decrypts it and substitutes its ID value in the polynomial to 
derive the cluster key (Ck). 
 
( )1 2 ,...,l  og e x x x Zx
α α αα ε− − −− + − ±
→  
1 2    ,..., x x x x zα α α α ε− − −→ − + − ±  
( )logWhere: e x x→ =  
 Where:  iCk x ID=→  
 
Table 1 List of Notations 
Notations Description 
P(x) Polynomial 
H Hash function 
ID Id of sensor node 
NK Network secret key 
ENk Encrypted with network secret key 
MAC Message authentication code 
Ck Cluster key (session key) 
Α Size of cluster (number of nodes) 
MAC_AddIid MAC of list of all ID 
CHId Cluster head ID 
Nonce Nounce 
KCb Key between CH and base station 
 
When some node joins or leaves the cluster, the CH 
generates a new polynomial P(x)' for the rest of member 
nodes of cluster to provide new Ck. Similarly, when new 
CH is selected in cluster it will repeat the same above 
process to generate new polynomial. 
 
4.1 Addition of Node 
 
In the proposed scheme, the entire cluster is not 
involved in rekeying process. Because of mobility in 
WMSN the node may be moved from one cluster to another 
or new node can be added to the network. A scalable key 
management scheme needs the capacity of adding new 
node to the network. These new nodes require to build up 
shared cluster key (Ck) with existing nodes for 
authentication. When a new node tries to join cluster, it 
sends join request message containing ID to the 
correspondence CH. The BS plays an important role in 
authentication process. CH checks it in its look up table to 
confirm whether the node is a new one or already existing 
node has moved. When BS knows that this node is a new 
node, then it performs a new node addition process using 
algorithm 1.1 in Fig. 2. If the node already exists in the 
network, but has moved from one cluster to another cluster 
then a node migration algorithm 1.2 shown in Fig. 3 is 
performed. 
                      
4.1.1 New Node Addition 
 
New node addition may occur in a cluster. When node 
is added to a network, it must become part of one cluster. 
This node sends joint request to CH. Node is already 
preloaded with Nk, hash function and unique ID, 
ENk(ID||MAC(ID)). CH forwards a request to the base 
station by adding CHId encrypted with KCB.  Base station 
checks the status of this node using some intrusions 
detection algorithm, which is not addressed in this work. 
After confirming its validity, BS broadcasts encrypted 
message containing LIdi (list of members ID), 
MAC_AddIdi and nonceN to all CH's as shown in 
algorithm 1.2. The CH multicast the cluster key (Ck), ID 
list of sensor nodes and MAC in encrypted format. 
This guarantees the freshness and reliability of the 
node joining procedure. Fig. 2 shows a new node addition, 
where CH gets authentication for BS. Base station 
maintains a list of abnormal nodes, checks legitimacy of 
every node using some intrusion detection mechanism, 
which is out of scope. 
 
4.1.2 Migration of Node 
 
Because of mobility in node, it is possible that some 
node moves from one cluster to another cluster in WMSN. 
CH node maintains a list of those nodes rejected at joining 
because they did not fulfil the security requirement as 
needed per BS. This protects from intruders to become part 
of the network during node migration from outside the 
networks. 
Before the node migration, it sends leave message to 
the existing CHi. CHi sends this migration information with 
valid ID of sensor node encrypted with KCb that wants to 
migrate. CHi removes this node from the cluster by 
generating new polynomial P(x)' and distributes it to its 
member nodes. At the same time this node sends join 
request message along with preload unique ID and Nk to 
another CHj to join their cluster. This CHj checks this node 
in their maintaining black list of rejected nodes, if it exists 
then rejects their request. Otherwise, CHj sends verification 
request to base station for confirming verification. The 
base station also checks their legitimacy by comparing this 
node ID in the whole black list nodes. If it does not exist, 
then BS computes authentication of encrypted message 
with KCb and sends it to CHj. Before the addition of this 
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migrated node in cluster, CHj confirms the message 
credibility parameters value and keys. After the 
confirmation of verification process, CHj sends a join 
success message to this node and informs BS through 
sending an acknowledgement. Fig. 2 shows the node 
migration algorithm for existing node of network. After 
allowing joining to this node CHj generates new 
polynomial to new cluster key (session key). 
 
 
Figure 2 Node Addition Algorithm  
 
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
This section analyses the security features of the 
proposed scheme. The threats and attack models try to 
affect the key management in cluster communication of 
two types, one is inside attacks and second is outside 
attacks. The cluster key is established through distribution 
of polynomial, which provides secure establishment of key 
between member nodes. Sharing of cluster key through 
polynomial between member node of restrict attacker to 
know about cluster key. Without knowing the cluster key, 
attacker cannot intercept member communication 
individual and be able to modify it. The proposed scheme 
ensures integrity and confidentiality through resistance 
against insider attacks. 
The non-member nodes or old member of cluster can 
eavesdrop the cluster information though outsiders attack. 
When the CH sends the expanded polynomial without 
encryption then outsider attacker attempts to eavesdrop 
that communication. Without knowing the cluster key Ck 
and even with no encryption, it is very hard to recover the 
cluster key. On the off chance that the adversary tries 
experimentation approach, the exponential log implements 
extra complexity. This approach may occupy the attacker 
to discover the log value for the separate x value. Deriving 
the cluster key using polynomial factorization is 
additionally exceptionally hard. To guess the cluster key, 
an extended polynomial needs really O (nlogn) solutions 
for a polynomial extension problem. Here, the presence of 
cluster key in the polynomial forces difficult in the 
polynomial factorization and making the polynomial 
factorization with a specific end goal to break the proposed 
scheme is non-deterministic polynomial-time (NP) hard. 
Whenever a member node leaves the cluster, CH delete 
their Id and generate new polynomial containing new 
cluster key Ck and send to the remaining member nodes. 
Hence, the cluster member nodes key is refreshed by 
receiving new one. Thus, departed member is prohibited to 
use their previous key for communication in cluster. 
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Figure 3 Node migration algorithm for cluster key management 
 
6 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
The proposed solution has been validated through 
simulation and comparing its performance with the EKMS 
[23], EDDK [24] and scheme [25]. The result comparison 
among the proposed scheme and the rest of schemes has 
been carried out using the following simulation parameters 
shown in Tab. 2. The proposed system efficiency is 
analysed based on the cost effectiveness by using these 
parameters: communication overhead, computational 
overheads, storage overhead, energy consumption and 
average latency. 
 
Table 2 Simulation Parameters 
Parameters Values 
Mobility model Random way point 
Number of sensor nodes 100 
Length of Data packet 256 Bit 
Length of control packet 50 Bit 
Initial Energy 1 Joule 
Interface Queue type Proposed scheme 
Communication model Bi-directional 
Simulation Area 1000 × 1000 m2 
Node Speed 1 - 30 m/second 
Maximum Queue 50 packets 
Simulation Time 300 Second 
 
Communication overhead is the measurement of 
number of bits transmission for the establishment of cluster 
key in case of new node addition or existing nodes 
migration between CH and member nodes of cluster.  Fig. 
4 shows the communication overhead for establishing new 
cluster key between all participating nodes in case of 
number of new nodes addition to cluster. The main reason 
of lower performance of EDDK is the usage of pairwise 
key and local cluster key for each node in cluster. In case 
of new node addition first pairwise keys are established, 
then cluster key will be established which increases 
communication cost. Similarly, EKMS and scheme [25] 
used local cluster key and foreign key for the establishment 
of new cluster key, which also increases communication 
overhead. Additionally when the number of new nodes 
increases, the communication overhead also increases in 
CH. Our proposed scheme has low communication 
overhead because of only one message exchange between 
new nodes and CH for addition, while the rest of messages 
for addition are exchanged between BS and CH. There is 
no need to exchange any messages except new polynomial 
after BS authentication between other member nodes of 
cluster. Thus, the communication overhead between the 
CH and member remains constant i.e. only polynomial is 
exchanged between CH and member node for new cluster 
key generation. Hence, the proposed scheme has superior 
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performance in communication cost compared with the 
other three schemes for secure new node addition in 
cluster.  
Similarly, communication overhead in case of existing 
nodes migration from one cluster to another cluster is 
shown in Fig. 5. Every node sends leave and join request 
to their alternative CH for leaving and joining new one. CH 
should update their cluster key for their member as 
authentication process is completed by BS.  In EDDK, 
node has exchanged two keys for leaving and two for 
joining which increases communication overhead. 
Similarly EKMS and scheme has higher communication 
cost when existing node moves from one cluster to another 
cluster. Our proposed scheme performed better then 
because only one leave request and one joint request are 
generated for existing node. CH generated new polynomial 
after confirming their authentication from BS. Therefore, 
member nodes do not need to communicate each other for 
establishing a new secure cluster key for their secure 
communication in cluster. At last, the communication 
overhead between the CH and each member node is 
constant because polynomials are exchanged when new 
cluster key is established. 
 
 
Figure 4 Communication cost in case of new node addition 
 
 
Figure 5 Communication Overhead in case of Node Migration 
 
Tab. 3 shows the Storage overhead of the proposed 
scheme, EDDK, EDMS and scheme [25]. The amount of 
storage capacity required to store security parameters for 
cluster key generation considered is storage overhead. 
EDDK has the worst storage due to the fact that each sensor 
node requires for storing a neighbor table because each 
node has to generate new common key for the new nodes 
addition. Additionally CH need more storage for storing all 
member nodes keys and tables. EKMS and scheme has also 
high storage overhead because of usage of two keys i.e. one 
is home key and the other is foreign key for the generation 
of cluster key. The proposed scheme has less storage 
overhead because CH store only one polynomial and n ID 
of member nodes of cluster. At the other side, member 
nodes store only one key along with one polynomial. 
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Table 3 Storage overhead Comparison 
Name of Scheme No. of Key stored in CH No. of key stored Member nodes 
EDDK n + n × Neighbor table 2 + 3 × Neighbor table 
CMKMS 2 × n + polynomial 2 keys + polynomial 
Scheme [25] 2 × n + polynomial 2 keys + polynomial 
Proposed Scheme n + 1 + polynomial 1 key + Polynomial 
 
Table 4 Computational cost Comparison 
Name of 
Schemes Encryp / Decryp in CH 
Encyp / Decryp in 
member node 
EDDK Encryp + Decryp + 1 Pseudo random function Encryp + Decryp 
CMKMS Encyp + Decryp Encypt + Decryp 
Scheme [25] Encyp + Decryp Encyp + Decryp 
Proposed scheme 0 0 
 
Tab. 4 and Fig. 6 show the computation overhead 
comparison of proposed scheme with the rest of three 
schemes for establishing a cluster key. Encryption and 
decryption plus one pseudo random generation function 
execution operations are required in order to established 
secure cluster key in EDDK. Similarly, in EKMS and 
scheme [25] also need an encryption and decryption 
operations for establishing cluster key for entire cluster. In 
the proposed scheme no encryption and decryption 
operation are required for establishing cluster key. For any 
number of nodes, CH sends an expanded polynomial 
without encryption. From CH point of view, the 
computational cost of computing polynomial is less than 
an encryption and decryption. The number of operations 
and time required to compute polynomial by the cluster in 
linear. Thus, the proposed scheme performed better 
performance in light of computation cost. 
The amount of energy consumed during cluster key 
establishment when member node leaves or joins a cluster 
in EDDK, EKMS and scheme [25] is compared with the 
proposed scheme. EDDK has lower performance in terms 
of energy consumption because the change in neighboring 
nodes effects the calculation of key, which may give wrong 
instance of key and re-calculation is needed. The main 
reason of EKMS having lower energy efficiency is the 
usage of RC5 algorithm for encryption and decryption 
involved during node leaving or joining of cluster. 
Similarly the scheme [25] also used ECDSA algorithm for 
encryption and decryption in case of leaving or joining of 
cluster. The total energy required to compute a polynomial 
of cluster is linear, while the rest of three schemes have n 
multiple and n shows the number of nodes in cluster. The 
energy consumption of computing a secure hash of sensor 
node id is 5,6 nJ per byte [32]. For cluster of n nodes, the 
hash computation of member node n consumes n × 5,6 nJ. 
Fig. 5 shows the energy consumption of cluster key 
establishment of the proposed scheme compared with the 
rest of three schemes. 
 
 




This work proposed a safe node migration with 
dependable handoff happening and fresh links are built up 
amongst CHs and member nodes. The proposed scheme 
generated polynomials whenever they are needed by 
nodes. Polynomials are generated dynamically when 
change occurs in cluster to create new cluster key (session 
key). Therefore, sensor nodes need to store only few 
preloaded messages. Additionally, the presented scheme 
has improved the scalability of number of nodes in network 
because of using polynomials for the computation and 
distribution of cluster keys having dynamic generation 
after the deployment or change in network. Our scheme 
frequently refreshes the cluster keys (session key) because 
easy new polynomial generation CH generated a new 
cluster key and used the polynomial for the secure 
distribution of cluster key without encryption and 
decryption. The proposed key management scheme is 
secure against eavesdropping and node capturing by using 
an efficient key management based on dynamic generation 
of polynomial. The proposed scheme has low 
communication, storage, and computation without 
compromising the security of key management. The 
amount of keys stored in CH is considerably reduced and 
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